Abstract: We pursue in this paper our study of approximations of values and -saddle-point policies in dynamic zero-sum games. After extending the general theorem for approximation, we study zero-sum stochastic games with countable state space, and non-bounded immediate reward. We focus on the expected average payo criterion. We use some tools developed in the rst paper, to obtain the convergence of the values as well as the convergence of the saddle-point policies in various approximation problems. We consider several schemes of truncation of the state space (e.g. nite state approximation) and approximations of games with discount factor close to one by the game with expected average cost. We use the extension of the general Theorem for approximation to study approximations in stochastic games with complete information. We nally consider the problem of approximating the sets of policies. We obtain some general results that we apply to a pursuit evasion di erential game. Approximations dans les jeux dynamiques a somme nulle, II R esum e : Nous poursuivons dans ce papier une etude portant sur l'approximation de la fonctions valeur, ainsi que des strategies -optimal pour des jeux dynamiques a deux joueurs et a somme nulle. Nous etendons dans un premier temps un th eor eme g en eral utilis e pour les approximations, puis nous etudions des jeux stochastiques a somme nulle dont l'espace d' etat est d enombrable, et dont le coût instantan e est non born e. On s'interesse plus particuli erement au coût moyen. Nous utilisons des outils que nous avons developp es dans le pr ec edent papier, pour obtenir la convergence de la fonction valeur ainsi que la convergence des strat egies -optimales dans di erents probl emes d'approximation.
Approximations dans les jeux dynamiques a somme nulle, II
Introduction
We pursue in this paper our study of approximations of values and saddle-point policies in dynamic zero-sum games. In a previous paper 25], we developed some tools for approximating zero-sum games, and applied them to stochastic games with discounted payo criterion. In this paper we extend the general theory for approximation to handle cases where a value does not exist for the limit game, and we apply the general theorems for approximation to the following dynamic zero-sum games. We rst consider approximation problems arrizing in stochastic games with expected average cost: nite state approximation of stochastic games with a countable state space, and convergence of stochastic games with discounted cost to the stochastic game with average cost. We then consider approximations in stochastic games with complete information, and problems in dynamic games related to discretizing of the strategy sets.
There is a rich literature on nite state approximation in the context of a single controller. The discounted reward was extensively studied, see 2, 11, 16, 17, 26, 27] , and 20, 28, 29] for related discretization results. For the expected average cost, there exist only few work on state approximations in the context of control, and none in the context of stochastic games. Even if existing schemes could be extended to the setting of stochastic game, they are still quite restricted since their convergence (in the setting of control) was established under conditions that seem very strong, and quite often non-applicable. Thomas and Stengos obtained several schemes for nite state approximations. They impose, some scrambling conditions which should hold uniformly in the states. They do not seem to hold for queueing applications, such as the models in 3, 4, 6]. Altman introduced several nite state approximation schemes 1, 2] for constrained control. They do not require the scrambling conditions, but have other restrictive conditions: the scheme in 1] requires some monotone structure on the immediate cost, and holds for immediate costs that are only functions of the state, and not of the actions. The scheme in 2] has the \ nite neighbor" restriction, i.e., from each state, only nitely many states are accessible within one step.
The rst approximation scheme that we introduce in the current paper relaxes the above restrictions, and is thus also useful and new in the case of a single controller.
The second scheme which we propose in this paper is an adaptation of the scheme from 2]. In both schemes, in addition to the convergence of the value, which is the question studied in most of the papers on state approximations, we obtain (i) the convergence of the policies, (ii) the robustness of policies, i.e. an equilibrium point for the limiting (in nite state) stochastic game G = G 1 is shown to be -equilibrium for the approximating games G n with all n large enough. On the other hand, for any , the equilibrium policies for G n are almost optimal for the limiting game, for all n large enough.
In the previous paper we focused on approximations of stochastic games with discounted cost and bounded reward, and mentioned that standard techniques can be used to transform problems with unbounded reward to problems with bounded ones. This is, however, not the case for the expected average payo criterion. The question of existence of value and of equilibrium stationary policies (under some recurrence conditions) for the case of unbounded reward was solved recently in 6, 7, 10, 21] . The growing interest in stochastic games with unbounded cost in recent years was partly driven by applications of stochastic games in telecommunications systems in general, and in queueing systems in particular. Although queues are always nite in practice (which results in a nite state space description), models of in nite queues are frequently more useful since they are usually easier to solve. Indeed, several dynamic games arising in such applications were explicitly solved 6, 8] , or, at least reduced to the search for equilibrium policies among small classes of policies 4, 5, 6]. The scheduling problem described in 6, 8] , the routing problem into two queues 4, 6] , the ow and service control in 5] have not been solved for the case of nite state space, since there is an e ect of the boundaries due to the niteness of the queues that destroys the nice structure of the problem with in nite state space. In all the above problems, it is unnatural to consider bounded costs. Since costs represent queue lengths or waitinig times, these typically grow to in nity as the number of \customers" in the queues grows to in nity. The theory developed in this paper allows to use the equilibrium policies obtained for the in nite queues to construct -equilibrium policies for the corresponding problems with nite queues, provided they are su ciently large.
A second issue in this paper is the convergence of stochastic games in the discount factor. The convergence of the value and equilibrium policies for discounted cost stochastic games to those of the average cost game are well known, see e.g. 14]. These were extended recently to unbounded cost (see 7, 21] ). We not only obtain an alternative proof for the above convergence of the values and policies, but also obtain new robustness results.
When the players are restricted to use pure strategies in a stochastic game, the game in general does not have a value anymore. Using an extension of the general approximation theorems, we study approximations under that restriction. This yields approximation theorems for stochastic games with complete information (where player 2 knows at time t the action taken by player 1 at time t).
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Finally, we consider the problem of approximating the set of policies by other sets. We obtain a general approximating theorem for the case that the strategy sets are endowed with the Hausdorf metric. We apply the theorem to a zero-sum pursuit evasion di erential game introduced in 9, 22] .
The structure of the paper is the following. We begin by citing and extending the general theory for approximations, developed in 25], in Section 2. We then introduce in Section 3 the model, notation and assumptions for the stochastic game. We present two schemes for state approximation in Section 4. The convergence in the discount factor is established in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss approximations for stochastic games with complete information. The approximation of the strategy sets is nially presented in Section 7 together with the application to the pursuit evasion game.
Key Theorems for approximations
We consider the following sequence G n = (S n ; U n ; V n ) n = 1; 2; :::; 1 of generic zerosum games where U n is the set of strategies (or policies) of player one and V n is the set of strategies of player two for the nth game. We assume that both U n and V n are endowed with some topology. S n : U n V n ! IR is a measurable function for all n. We de ne the upper (lower) value of the game: (1) G = (S; U; V ) def = (S 1 ; U 1 ; V 1 ) will be called the limit game. It will be assumed that it has a value R def = R 1 = ValfS(u; v)g u;v . A strategy u 2 U n is said to be -optimal for player one in game n if
which is equivalent to inf v2V n S n (u ; v) R n ? . It is said to be strong -optimal for player one in game n if it satis es inf v2V n S n (u ; v) R n ?
A strategy v 2 V n is said to be -optimal for player two in game n if 
which is equivalent to sup u2U n S n (u; v ) R n + . It is said to be strong -optimal if sup u2U n S n (u; v ) R n + Note that strongly -optimality implies -optimality. If a game has a value R n = R n then strong -optimality is equivalent to -optimality. Assume that (S n ; U n ; V n ) converge (in some sense) to (S; U; V ). We are interested in the following questions: (Q1) Convergence of the values: does R n (or R n ) converge to R? (Q2) Convergence of policies: Fix some 0. Let n be a sequence of positive real numbers such that lim n!1 n . Assume that u n and v n are n -optimal policies for the nth game. Are u n and v n \almost" optimal for the limit game, for all n large enough? (Q3) Let u 2 U (resp. v 2 V ) be some limit point of u n (resp. v n ), de ned above.
Is u (resp. v) -optimal for the limit game? (Q4) Robustness of the optimal policy: If u (resp. v ) is an -optimal for the limit game, can we derive of it an \almost" (strong) optimal policy for the nth approximating game, for all n large enough?
A straightforward generalization of Theorem 2. 
Then
(1) lim n!1 R n = lim n!1 R n = R.
(2) For any 0 > + 3 1 , there exists N such that 1 n (u n ) (resp. 2 n (v n ), see de nitions in (Q2)) is 0 -optimal for the limit game, for all n N. (3) Let u (resp. v ) be -optimal for the limit game. Then for all 0 > + 3 1 , there exists N( 0 ) such that 1 n (u ) (resp. 2 n (v )) is strong 0 -optimal for the nth approximating game, for all n N( 0 ). Suppose u 2 U (resp. v 2 V ) is a limit point of 1 n (u n ) (resp. 2 n (v n )). Then u (resp. v) is ( + 5 1 )-optimal for the limit game.
INRIA Remark 2.1 (i) Whenever U n = U and V n = V do not depend on n, n and n will be chosen as the indentity maps.
(ii) It follows from the proof of part (1) in the above Theorem that if for all G n , n = 1; 2; :::; 1 there exist optimal policies for both players and if U n = U and V n = V do not depend on n, then jR n ? Rj sup u;v jS n (u; v) ? S(u; v)j; jR n ? Rj sup u;v jS n (u; v) ? S(u; v)j Next, we relax the assumption that the limit game has a value: R 1 6 = R 1 . We show that Theorem 2.1 still holds, by appropriately enlarging the policy spaces and rede ning the cost, so that the upper (or lower) value becomes a real value of a new game.
We consider the convergence of the upper values (and corresponding optimal or almost optimal policies) of the approximating games to those of the limit game. The corresponding convergence for the lower values are obtained in the same way.
De ne U n = f the class of functions U n ! V n g. De ne the costŜ n : U n V n ! IR byŜ n ( ; v) = S n ( (v); v). Lemma 2.1 (i) For all n, the new game G n = (Ŝ n ; U n ; V n ) has a value R n , and R n = R n .
(ii) v is ?optimal for player 2 in game G n if and only if it is ?optimal in game G n .
Proof. n (u n ) (resp. 2 n (v n ), see de nitions in (Q2)) is 0 -optimal for the limit game, for all n N. (3) Let u (resp. v ) be -optimal for the limit game. Then for all 0 > +3 1 , there exists N( 0 ) such that 1 n (u ) (resp. 2 n (v )) is 0 -optimal for the n approximating game, for all n N( 0 ).
Proof. Consider the new games G n de ned above. We show that the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 hold also for G n . The mapping~ 2 n ;~ 2 n for the new games are unchanged; 2 n = 2 n ;~ 2 n = 2 n : The mappings~ 1 n : U n ! U and~ 1 n : U ! U n for the new games are de ned as
8v 2 V n :
With these de nitions as well as the de nition of the costsŜ n , it follows that (A1) and (A2) hold for G n . The proof now follows by Lemma 2.1.
We may further obtain convergence results for the optimal (or -optimal) responses (in case that the value of the limit game does not exist). To simplify the formulation, this is done below in terms of the new games G n : Theorem 2.3 Consider the new games G n , and let n ; v n be de ned as u n in (Q2) (above Theorem 2.1. Under the conditions of Theorem 2.2, (1) lim n!1 R n = R = R, (2) For any 0 > +3 1 , there exists N such that~ 1 n ( n ) (resp.~ 2 n (v n )) is 0 ?optimal for G 1 , for all n N.
(3) Let be -optimal for player 1 in the limit game G 1 . Then for all 0 > + 3 1 , there exists N( 0 ) such that~ 1 n ( ) (resp.~ 2 n (v )) is 0 -optimal for the n approximating game G n for all n N( 0 ).
Next, we consider the result corresponding to statement (4) These sets are assumed to be compact metric sets. Let U and V be the set of behavioral strategies for both players. A strategy u 2 U is a sequence u = (u 0 ; u 1 ; :::) where u t is a probability measure over the available actions, given the whole history of previous states and of previous actions of both players as well as the current state.
A Markov policy q = fq 0 ; q 1 ; :::g is a policy (for either player one or two) where q t is allowed to depend only on t and on the state at time t. A stationary (mixed) policy g for player one is characterized by a conditional distribution p g ( j j) over A j , so that p g (A j j j) = 1, which is interpreted as the distribution over the actions available at state j which player I uses when it is in state j. With some abuse of notation, we shall set g( j j) = p g ( j j) for stationary g. Let S A be the set of stationary policies for player 1, and de ne similarly the stationary policies 
Denote P(u; v) = p(j; u; v; k)] j;k .
Next, we introduce a metric topology on the sets of stationary policies. For any compact metric set ?, let M 1 (?) denote the set of probability measures on the Borel subsets of ? endowed with the weak topology (?) (see 19] ). The class of stationary policies for player 1 (and similarly for player 2) can be identi ed with the set Q i2I M 1 (A i ) M 1 (B i ); moreover it is compact with respect to the product topology Q i2I (A i ) (B i ).
Let (u; v) be a pair of strategies and let i 2 I be a xed initial state. Let I t ; A t ; B t ; t = 0; ::: be the resulting stochastic process of the states and actions of the players. Let E u;v i denote the expectation with respect to the measure de ned by u; v; i. 
such that jvj is nite and v(0) = 0.
(iii) g is the unique value of the stochastic game.
(iv) Let (u; v) be stationary policies such that u(i); v(i) are optimal for the dummy game in the curly brackets in (7). Then, they are optimal for the stochastic game. 
State truncation and approximation
In the following approximating schemes, we modify the \limit" stochastic game in the following way. We Consider an increasing set of states I 1 ; I 2 ; ::: converging to I, such that 0 2 I 1 . The nth stochastic game is restricted to the set I n . In the game G n , we modify the transition probabilities so as to eliminate all transitions outside the set I n . The two schemes will di er by the way that such transitions will be replaced. Introduce the following assumption (B3) (r; n) = sup 
Scheme I
In the game G n , we modify the transition probabilities so as to eliminate all transitions outside the set I n ; we replace transitions outside of I n by transitions to state 0. Hence, p n (i; a; b; j) is de ned by: 
for all n, g n and v n indeed exist and are unique since the assumptions (B1) and (B2) remain valid for this problem and theorem 3.1 applies. Moreover, we have that:
R n (i) = ValfS n (i; u; v)g u;v = g n 8i 2 I:
In order to prove the convergence of the state approximation scheme we introduce the following quantities: 1 + P j6 =0 p n (i; u; v; j) n (j; u; v); for i 2 I n (i; u; v) for i 6 2 I n (13) RR n 2348
The uniqueness follows from the fact that the above equations are contracting due to (B2). Note that functions w(:; u; v) and w n (:; u; v) are -bounded for all pair (u; v) on every subset J of I. Since both w(0; u; v) and (0; u; v) are both non-zero and nite, it follows (see Chung 12] p. 91-92) that the expected average cost is given by the following ratio between the the total cost and the expected hitting time of state zero S(i; u; v) = w(0; u; v) E (0; u; v) and S n (i; u; v) = w n (0; u; v) E n (0; u; v) : (14) Theorem 4.1 Assume (B1)-(B3). All statements of Theorem 2:1 hold, where S n and S are the expected average payo s de ned in (6) , with the transition probabilities p and p n (de ned in (8)) respectively.
Proof. Fix some initial state i. We use Theorem 2.1. We begin by establishing conditions (A1) and (A2). Since U = U n and V n = V for each n, it su ces to show that S n (u; v) := S n (i; u; v) converges to S(u; v) := S(i; u; v) uniformly on I. Hence, we set 1 n , 2 n , 1 n and 2 n to be identity.
Let J be a given subset of I, and (u; v) a pair of strategies. To avoid cumbersome notations we will write w(:) (resp w n (:)) instead of w(:; u; v) (resp w n (:; u; v)). We rst want to prove that lim n!+1 k w n ? w k J = 0 once we show that, one obtains in the same way that lim n!+1 k E ? E n k J = 0, and the uniform convergence of S n (u; v) to S(u; v) now follows from (14) . We use an idea introduced by Cavazos-Cadena 11] and used in 25] for a similar problem. Fix arbitrarily small, and de ne the sequence g k in the following way. 
Scheme II
In the previous scheme, we replaced transitions outside of I n by transitions to state 0. In some applications this may be undesirable; this is the case when the games with truncated space describe real problems that we wish to approximate by some game with an in nite state space. To illustrate this, consider a queue with a nite length L, and assume that the state is the number of customers in the queue. Then, typically, if a transition from state L to state L + 1 were possible in the case of in nite queue, then in the problem with truncated state space, which corresponds to a nite queue, it is replaced by a transition from L to L. In the previous scheme, it would be replaced by a transition to state 0. This would be especially undesirable, since in queueing problems, we usually have the property of transitions to closest neighbors: from each state, only nitely many neighboring states can be reached in one step. So, having a transition from state L to 0 does not describe a realistic model of a nite queue.
In the following scheme, we consider a truncation that is adapted to problems with the property of closest neighbor transitions, and that replace transitions outside of I n by transitions to the \boundaries". We thus assume converge to S(u; v) uniformly in all stationary policies. This implies assumptions (A1) and (A2). Assumptions (A3) and (A4) relate only to the limit game, and therefore the proof is the same as in the previous Section. The theorem now follows from Theorem 2.1.
Convergence of the discounted cost to the average cost
Conditions for the convergence of the value and equilibrium policies for discounted cost stochastic games to those of the average cost game are well known, see e.g. 14]. These were extended recently to unbounded cost (see 7, 21] 
The following was proved in 7] Theorem 3.4:
Theorem 5.1 Assume (B1) and (B2). Then (i) A value R (i) exists for the discounted cost.
(ii) Optimal stationary policies exist for both players for any discount factor 0 < < 1 (they are said to be -optimal).
(iii) Any limit-point (as tends to one) of -optimal stationary policies is expected average optimal; moreover, the value of the discounted games converge to the value of the expected average game. 
Stochastic games with complete information
In Sections 4, 5 and in 25] we described several approximation problems in stochastic games, where we had a value in the limit game. In all those cases, we considered (without loss of optimality) the (randomized) stationary or the (randomized) Markov policies. If we now restrict to pure stationary or pure Markov policies, the corresponding games will not have in general a value.
This restriction to pure strategies is equivalent to playing stochastic games with complete information, see 15, 18] , in which the information structure is slightly di erent than the one we considered in Section 3. The information available for both players at time t is the same as in the standard model described in Section 3; the second player, however, has in addition to that, the information on the action chosen at time t by the rst player. The equivalence between a stochastic game with complete information and a standard stochastic game with restriction to pure policies is the following. First, if a stochastic game with complete information is played, then by standard arguments, the players may restrict to pure strategies, without loss of optimality. Suppose the state is x at time t. In any game, the second player, chooses a policy as a function of the policy of the rst player. Since the rst player restricts to pure strategies, knowing that the state is x and knowing the strategy of player 1, enables player 2 to know what action will be played at time t by player 1. (Note that if player 1 did not restrict to pure strategies, then this argument would not hold). Hence, the standard stochastic game has the same information structure as the one with complete information.
Since we established conditions (A1) and (A2) for all the problems considered in Sections 4, 5 and in 25], they hold in particular if we restrict to pure strategies (or equivalently, if games with complete information are player instead). Therefore, INRIA the convergence of policies and values in Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 hold for all these problems.
Applying Theorem 2.4 is more delicate, since only in special cases, can we de ne a topology over the space of responses of player 2 such that assumptions (A3) and (A4) holds (as opposed to standard stochastic games, where (A3) and (A4) need to hold for policies, and not for responses). In case that the action space available to player 1 is nite, one may identify the class of pure stationary response strategies of player 2 (corresponding to pure stationary policies of player 1) with the set of functions I ! A ! B, endowed with the weak topology. The continuity assumptions (A3) and (A4) can now be established using arguments as in Remark 3.1 in 25] and 7].
7 A nite approximation of strategy sets Another type of approximation that arises in dynamic games is the countable or nite approximation of strategy sets. This step is necessary when we want to perform numerical computations, and when the strategy sets are in nite or continuous, or both.
Let U and V be metric sets of policies for players one and two, and let S(u; v) correspond to the cost associated to the pair of strategies u 2 U; v 2 V. Introduce the following sets of strategies: U U and V V, and the sequences fU n g n2IN U and fV n g n2IN V. U n and V n are assumed to be countable or nite sets of policies. 
Similarly, it follows from (18) and since S is lower semicontinuous in u uniformly in v that there exists N 2 such that for all n > N 2 S(u n ; v) ? S( 1 n (u n ); v) 2 :
(21) and (22) imply (20) by choosing N = sup(N 1 ; N 2 ), which concludes the proof.
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Remark 7.1 In many applications (e.g. 9, 22]), the strategy sets are compact.
Hence it su ces to require in (A' 3) and (A' 4) the semi-continuity properties; the uniform semi-continuity is then a consequence of the compactness of the strategy sets.
As an application of the Theorem 7.1, we present the following continuous time di erential pursuit evasion game by Bernhard and Shinar 9, 22] . We shall use the same notation as in 9, 22] where w is a noise and h a , h b are globally Lipschitz over I. They are restricted to using feedback strategies (a(t) = 1 (y a (t)), (b(t) = 2 (y b (t))) Lipschitz continuous, then the set of strategies is compact in the topology of the uniform convergence. It is assumed that the noise model and the solution concept of the di erential equations are such that the payo P (the expected value of a continuous function of closest approach) is a continuous function of the strategies for the topology of uniform convergence. If 1 and 2 are compact metric strategies spaces and 1 and 2 are closed subsets of 1 and 2 respectively and U = ( 1 ) and V = ( 2 ) are the sets of probability measures over 1 and 2 , we know that there exist optimal mixed strategies that achieve the value V ( 1 ; 2 ) = min u2U max v2V J(u; v) = ( 2 ) Bernhard and Shinar establish the convergence of the values of some approximating problems to the value of the original one.
We show that, in fact, all the statments concerning the convergence of policies in Theorem 2.1 also hold (with 1 = 0). In 9], the continuity of V (:; :) is proved, i.e. (A' 3) and (A' 4) are established. They present a nite approximation of this problem by considering nite subsets of i i = 1; 2 that converge to i in the Hausdorf topology (and thus, (A' 1) holds).
